"What do you mean, 'other parts'?" says the hypothetical Orthodox believer. "If it's all from God then it's all from God. The Torah is eternally relevant – there are no 'problematic parts'. If there is something we object to, then the problem lies with us. Either we're not understanding it correctly, or we've been infected by outside thinking. Torah is the word of God, and God is perfectly good by definition."
That is not to say of course that "modern free society" should always be listened to. If we were to throw out all Jewish practices and teachings which at various times in history have been deemed "immoral," we may not exist as a people today. Even more so, sometimes our strength as a people is davka (precisely) that we are willing to stand alone, against prevailing societal beliefs and norms, in order to defend what we believe to be true and right. This goes back to Abraham the "ivri" ("Hebrew"), whose strength was his willingness to cross over and stand "on the other side" of the river, to break away from the idolatry of his homeland, from those beliefs and practices with which he was raised.
To give one
current example of a Jewish practice which has been termed "immoral" by some, but which we may not wish to abandon quite yet, there is the issue of shechita (ritual slaughter). Kosher
slaughter has been banned in New Zealand and has been under intense scrutiny in
European countries, particularly the Netherlands, on the grounds that it is
less humane (i.e., induces more pain and suffering) than stunning an animal prior
to slaughter. However, given the fact that this claim itself is inconclusive
and the subject of much debate, and given the appalling conditions animals are
routinely kept in under "normal" commercial agricultural auspices, before being "humanely" stunned, it is perhaps not a stretch to conclude that this issue is a red herring, an excuse to
legislate anti-Semitism under the guise of animal rights. Therefore, kosher
slaughter, when done properly, conscientiously, should not "necessarily" bother
us as Jews (that is, relative to normative practice, but see below), despite the fact that some would label it "immoral."
Of course, it follows from the above that if a new technology for animal slaughter were to be devised which was truly and indisputably painless, and yet we still insisted on the use of shechita, this might be cause to reconsider the matter. And if the wider society were to renounce the practice of animal slaughter altogether, and yet Jews insisted on maintaining it for religious reasons (e.g. to have meat on the Shabbos table), I would consider this to be a potential moral problem. In fact, following a more "Abrahamic" spirit, I would imagine the idealistic founder of Judaism to perhaps be the first to stand on the other side of the river and say "enough" with cruel industrial farming practices, and enough with the shedding of blood for food altogether. But I recognize this supposition would be the subject of hot debate, and I'm afraid we have even hotter territory to cover.
Of course, it follows from the above that if a new technology for animal slaughter were to be devised which was truly and indisputably painless, and yet we still insisted on the use of shechita, this might be cause to reconsider the matter. And if the wider society were to renounce the practice of animal slaughter altogether, and yet Jews insisted on maintaining it for religious reasons (e.g. to have meat on the Shabbos table), I would consider this to be a potential moral problem. In fact, following a more "Abrahamic" spirit, I would imagine the idealistic founder of Judaism to perhaps be the first to stand on the other side of the river and say "enough" with cruel industrial farming practices, and enough with the shedding of blood for food altogether. But I recognize this supposition would be the subject of hot debate, and I'm afraid we have even hotter territory to cover.
Which brings us to the next point... As an
example of a branch of traditional Jewish practice deemed morally problematic, and that without
question certainly does contravene the standard practices of free and civil
society today, we can look at the unequal treatment of women in Jewish law.
Even from a more "minimalist" Orthodox position (i.e. not including stringencies which have become the norm in many religious communities), women are not counted in a minyan (prayer quorum), do not conduct religious services, may not serve as witnesses in a beit din (religious court) nor as dayanim (judges in religious court), may not obtain a divorce without consent of their husband, and technically/Halachically speaking must be "acquired" by their husband in order to be considered married. To any one of these Halachic facts on the ground, we might say "dayeinu" – it would be "enough for us" to be utterly embarrassed, ashamed, that women in free, secular society (and of course in other Jewish denominations) enjoy every measure of equality under the law, but under standard Orthodox Jewish law they do not. Even without using terms such as "second-class citizen" or assuming any diminution of women in the minds of Orthodox men, even assuming the utmost in respect and admiration for women, and that on the whole Orthodox women themselves enjoy their lifestyle and would defend the tradition (though there are certainly those who do not and find themselves "stuck," with no other choice), the fact that such inequality exists per se, in law and in practice, is enough to call it "immoral." Yes, even a hundred years ago, Judaism’s policy with regard to women could perhaps have been said to fall within the ethical bounds of civil and free society, but that is by no means any longer the case.
Even from a more "minimalist" Orthodox position (i.e. not including stringencies which have become the norm in many religious communities), women are not counted in a minyan (prayer quorum), do not conduct religious services, may not serve as witnesses in a beit din (religious court) nor as dayanim (judges in religious court), may not obtain a divorce without consent of their husband, and technically/Halachically speaking must be "acquired" by their husband in order to be considered married. To any one of these Halachic facts on the ground, we might say "dayeinu" – it would be "enough for us" to be utterly embarrassed, ashamed, that women in free, secular society (and of course in other Jewish denominations) enjoy every measure of equality under the law, but under standard Orthodox Jewish law they do not. Even without using terms such as "second-class citizen" or assuming any diminution of women in the minds of Orthodox men, even assuming the utmost in respect and admiration for women, and that on the whole Orthodox women themselves enjoy their lifestyle and would defend the tradition (though there are certainly those who do not and find themselves "stuck," with no other choice), the fact that such inequality exists per se, in law and in practice, is enough to call it "immoral." Yes, even a hundred years ago, Judaism’s policy with regard to women could perhaps have been said to fall within the ethical bounds of civil and free society, but that is by no means any longer the case.
This is without even touching on more extremist (a.k.a. standard "Haredi") practices such as the exclusion of women from Orthodox religious or political leadership
positions, from the front of "mehadrin" bus lines, from the media, including
the removal of women’s images from periodicals or anywhere in the religious
public sphere, and the attempt to prevent women from speaking at professional
conferences or even at a loved one’s funeral. It does not touch on other
Halachic injunctions such as kol isha (the prohibition of hearing women
singing), "modest" dress (covering elbows, knees, collar bones, etc.), or covering one’s hair when married, which can constitute
an impingement of women’s self-expression. It does not touch on teachings or
prayers within the tradition which are potentially demeaning to women, such as
the "shelo asani isha" blessing (thanking God for not having been made a
woman), or sayings such as "the more wives, the more witchcraft" (Pirkei Avot),
or that women are "light of intellect" (T.B. Shabbat 33b). It does not touch on
passages from the Torah itself, such as the right of a father to sell his
daughter into slavery (Exodus 21:7), or the monetary "valuation" of a woman as
being less than a man (Leviticus 27), or the humiliation of the "Sota" (a woman
suspected of adultery, Numbers 5:11-29), or the length of a woman’s "impurity"
following the birth of a girl being twice as long as for the birth of a boy
(Leviticus 12), or the superstitious notion that niddah (the menstrual period) is
considered a "sickness" requiring her to be segregated (Leviticus 12:2, hence the
term "niddah" stemming from "niduy" – being sequestered, separated off). And of
course all that is without even touching the very idea that a woman is taken from a man’s rib,
responsible for the downfall of man, and fated to be ruled over by her husband
as punishment. Any one of these points alone might be difficult to swallow, but when taken all together, it is simply overwhelming, if not downright depressing!
Yes, it is true that there are numerous laws in Torah designed to protect women's interests, and that during many periods in history the Torah's position toward women was probably considered positively "liberal." It is
also true that for every derogatory statement about women in the Torah tradition,
there are probably a dozen other positive, glowing statements, extolling the praises of
women. And indeed even the derogatory statements are interpreted in ways which
take the "edge" off, so as to prevent them from being understood to demean
women in any way.
But in response to this last point, while I applaud any and all goodwill interpretive efforts, it is crucial that we also seriously address the plain meaning of a statement. Let me attempt to explain why.
But in response to this last point, while I applaud any and all goodwill interpretive efforts, it is crucial that we also seriously address the plain meaning of a statement. Let me attempt to explain why.
Imagine if you
will, sitting in an unfamiliar house of worship where people are praying, and your ears perk up
upon hearing them recite the words "greedy Jews" in passing. You are taken aback, and when
you approach them afterwards about your dismay, they reassure you that despite the way it
sounds, they interpret this text to mean "greedy for the well-being of others."
Alternatively, they point you to several other quotes that speak about Jews in
a positive light. Would you be satisfied with this explanation, or would you
leave with some grave misgivings about this religion and its adherents? And what if in addition to there being
unflattering statements about Jews, there were laws on the books which limited
the participation of Jews within their society – not in any wicked and anti-Semitic "Nuremberg Laws" sense, but simply due to "kavod hatzibur," a question
of maintaining "communal honor" (the reason given in Halacha for why a woman is
not called up to read from the Torah)?* Would you be perfectly hunky-dory with that, or would
you instead want all such legal distinctions undone, and all outwardly offensive
statements taken out of the liturgy and completely and unapologetically
repudiated?
Point being,
the promotion of more "palatable" interpretations, as well-meaning as they are
surely intended, is not nearly good enough as a solution for addressing the problem. Why? Because it still leaves the problematic elements/practices themselves intact,
and this is something we would in no way possibly tolerate in any other society
(as the hypothetical scenario above was intended to illustrate). The way women
are addressed in traditional Torah/Orthodox teachings and practice is, many
times, simply "immoral." In fact one of the hallmarks of non-Orthodox Jewish
denominations is their decision to tackle women’s inequality head-on, by
renouncing and eradicating it, since it is seen without question to be a
moral failing of traditional observance and belief. Why then does the Orthodox
community not see it? Why does it offer mere apologetics as the solution? To be fair,
certain Modern Orthodox circles have taken the issue seriously, and have worked
to take Halacha to its very limits in order to undo some of the gender
inequality. But why stop there?
Enter God.
As stated above, Torah (and
by extension Halacha) is seen in Orthodox belief
as God-given. Therefore, one cannot be "Orthodox" in any normative sense and
say that there is something "immoral" in the Torah. Some Orthodox Jews may be willing to
say that a particular area of Halacha, as it is currently practiced, is immoral, and that
our duty as God-fearing Torah Jews is to wrestle with and work through the
Halacha so that we can bring it more in consonance with God's will, closer to the true moral position – and I do
think this is a valid and even noble approach. However, there is only so far
one can stretch Halacha, and even the most liberal Orthodox poskim
(people who render practical legal decisions in Jewish Law) will never say, "In
this case we simply need to bypass Halacha." Again, the reason is that even if Halacha
itself is in the hands of the human being to work with, the Halachic process
itself is understood to be God-given, and to choose to veer outside of Halacha altogether
is to contravene God, to put oneself outside the faith.
It is therefore God that is the
factor preventing the Torah world from dismantling and rejecting positions
within Jewish tradition which have, over time, become immoral. The problem is "God" insofar as believing in the traditional/Orthodox/literalist conception of the Biblical God, which renders the text (and often the Rabbinic tradition) immutable and unassailable. This reticence to deal unapologetically with immoral beliefs and practices exists even among the most liberal
Orthodox communities, and it is all the more pronounced, and disturbingly ideological, in "Ultra-Orthodox" communities. Immoral statements in the Bible are routinely apologized for not
only regarding women, but also concerning slavery, calls for genocide, stoning of
Sabbath-breakers, speaking of gay relations as an "abomination," lauding Abraham for his willingness to sacrifice
Isaac, and on, and on. The only reason these are apologized for, and not
definitively repudiated, consigned to the annals of ancient history with a sigh of relief and a hearty "good riddance," is that such laws and narratives are seen as the
living word and will of God Himself. Belief in God, in the Orthodox sense of
the term, thus has the capacity to undermine and subvert our morality, our better judgment, our sense of right and wrong. It gets us
to do, believe, support and apologize for things which we would otherwise abhor.
If we would cease believing in God in any sense of authoring,
commanding, sanctioning, or perhaps even "inspiring" the Torah and the Halachic
process, then we would with no guilt or misgivings whatsoever be able to rid
ourselves of positions that we identify to be immoral. If Torah is not eternal and immutable, but rather the product of human beings,
then by all means as human beings we can and must make it work for us. Yes, we ought to be cautious
not to jettison practices and ideas whenever someone in the world screams the
word "immoral." We must be thoughtful and judicious about change. We would also
be wise not to overly "judge" the Torah or our forbears for their beliefs and
practices. It is possible to vigorously repudiate such beliefs and practices,
and yet attempt to judge the texts and scholars of our tradition favorably and
compassionately given their historical context. And I would not advocate "erasing" anything from the Jewish historical record. But I would suggest that we make every effort to abolish immoral practices. And I would recommend that whenever we encounter teachings which fly in the face of our ethical sensibilities, that we actively renounce them, speak about them with discomfort and remorse. When the Torah is read in shul, we might read passages such as the "Sota" in a more hushed or less enthusiastic tone, as is currently done when reading the section of the "curses" in Deuteronomy. There are many ways to express protest while at the same time according due dignity to the tradition. And in the final analysis, I would argue that by protesting aspects of the tradition, that itself accords dignity to the tradition.
One may ask,
why not simply adopt a non-fundamentalist belief in God, or switch over to a
non-Orthodox denomination? To that I would answer: By all means! However, if
one wishes to benefit from the richness and depth of a Torah-observant life, if
this provides a person with meaning and joy and connectedness to a community,
if one considers robust observance and involvement in Torah learning to be key to the
survival and success of the Jewish people, but at the same time she/he is embarrassed
by the immoral "baggage" – whether practices or dogma – that traditional Orthodoxy "schleps" around with it, and cannot/will not tolerate carrying it, then what
this writing is intended to impart is that it is possible to have it both ways. It
is possible, if we desire it, to retain the greatness of observant life and simply
drop the rest, to just… let it go. And the key I propose, to letting it go, is to shed the myth of
God as Commander and Teacher, Author and Authoritarian, Rewarder and
Punisher. Remove God as a "justification" for any and all Jewish practice, and
we will be well on our way.
*I must
admit I was a bit taken aback, when immediately after writing this last
statement about "communal honor" as distinct from the Nuremberg Laws, I
discovered that the first of the Nuremberg laws is in fact called: "The Law for
the Protection of German Blood and German Honour." No, I do not maintain that
traditional Torah/Orthodox policies toward women are anything even remotely
similar to Nazi policy, God forbid. I see this as merely a disturbing
coincidence, but it does underscore the point that we cannot take the language we use for
granted!